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ABSTRACT 
When the recognition of foreign-country judgments is sought in the 
United States, it occurs that recognition is denied due to lack of 
jurisdiction. In the United States, jurisdiction of foreign courts is 
examined according to the same due process requirements of the U.S. 
Constitution that apply to direct jurisdiction and to the recognition of 
sister-state judgments. These criteria were developed in a national, 
federal, interstate context and are not appropriate for claims involving 
international elements, which necessarily follow jurisdictional 
concepts differently than the United States does. 
American scholars consider this approach to be state-of-the-art, as 
it does not discriminate between local and international situations. 
However, the result is an undue overprotection of defendants to the 
detriment of plaintiffs abroad. This is not a political choice, but rather 
an unseen result of the internationalization of jurisdictional concepts 
that were developed inside the United States for domestic application. 
A new solution is called for and proposed in this paper: namely, a 
broader acceptance of the jurisdiction exercised by foreign courts. 
Otherwise, the application of the due process clause results in the 
exact opposite of what it stands for: an undue process. 
I 
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-COUNTRY 
JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In today’s globalized world, civil judgments frequently must be 
recognized and executed abroad. This is why the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law is currently trying to draft an 
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international convention that would facilitate the worldwide 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments (“Judgments 
Project”).1 The initiative goes back to a U.S. proposal presented in 
1992,2 and is still a work in progress.3 Achieving agreement turns out 
to be a difficult task, as regimes of judgments recognition vary greatly 
and some countries are limited in making changes due to 
constitutional restrictions.4 
Roughly summarized, three main recognition regimes exist 
worldwide, with approximately one third of the countries in each 
category.5 In the first category are the countries that have a very strict 
 
1 Hague Conference, The Judgments Project (2015), https://www.hcch.net/en/projects 
/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
2 Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, 
to Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(May 5, 1992), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65973.pdf; compare Arthur 
T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for 
the Hague Conference, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994) (for a discussion of the 
history of the early project). 
3 More limited recognition conventions have been concluded since (but not ratified by 
the United States), such as the Choice of Court Agreements Convention of 2005. 
However, the big goal of a general judgments recognition convention has not succeeded 
yet, and is still on the agenda of The Hague Conference. 
4 In Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Cf. Eric Porterfield, A 
Domestic Proposal to Revive the Hague Judgments Convention: How to Stop Worrying 
about Streams, Trickles, Asymmetry, and a Lack of Reciprocity, 25 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 82 (2014) (“[T]he Hague Judgments Convention would likely conflict with the 
Constitution.”). The author even goes so far as to suggest that “the Hague Judgment 
Convention can be reworded to address the asymmetries of personal jurisdiction and 
judgment enforcement without running afoul of the Constitution.” Id. at 87 (emphasis 
added). This obviously is no solution, as every country would make similar requests; thus, 
the project is gravely weakened. 
5 The data for the comparative analysis is based on secondary sources, including the 
following summaries, studies and reports: an unpublished comparative study made by 
JONES DAY for The Hague Conference Permanent Bureau regarding JURISDICTIONAL 
GAPS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT (2015), quoted here with the kind 
permission of the authors; EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
MATTERS, NATIONAL REPORTS ON RESIDUAL JURISDICTION, available for all EU 
countries at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_germany_en.pdf 
(please replace ‘germany’ by any other EU-memberstate); another useful database is 
WIPO LEX of the WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, i.e., a search facility 
for codes of civil procedure and information about recognition of foreign judgments 
available on http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en; PATRICK DORIS, ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 2015 (2015); see also Hague Conference, supra note 1. 
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recognition regime,6 or recognize only judgments from countries with 
which they have a bilateral treaty.7 The second category is composed 
of those countries that take a more liberal approach and favor 
recognition of foreign judgments, in the sense that they recognize 
even judgments from countries that exercised jurisdiction in a 
situation where their own courts would not have had jurisdiction.8 The 
third group of countries follows the “mirror principle” (or 
symmetry9)—i.e., when determining whether a foreign judgment can 
be recognized or not, those courts examine if, in a similar situation, 
they would themselves have had jurisdiction to hear the case. In these 
countries, the jurisdictional power of the foreign court must be 
symmetrical to the one of the local court, with the effect that both 
jurisdictional powers are like mirrors. Or, in more technical terms: in 
order to determine the appropriateness of the jurisdictional power 
exercised by foreign courts (so-called “indirect jurisdiction”), the 
criteria that govern the jurisdictional competence of local courts for 
direct jurisdiction10 are used (“mirrored”) in order to determine the 
appropriateness of the jurisdictional power exercised by foreign 
courts (indirect jurisdiction).11 
 
6 In Australia for example, grounds of direct jurisdiction (determined by case law) are 
much broader than the accepted grounds of indirect jurisdiction (section 7(3) Australian 
Foreign Judgments Act 1991). Other examples: Nigeria, Norway, UAE, UK. 
7 Examples: Austria, China, Denmark. 
8 For an example of indirect jurisdiction that is broader than direct jurisdiction, 
compare the Swiss BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG] 
[Federal Act on Private International Law] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291 (Switz.): regarding 
direct jurisdiction, art. 59 gives jurisdiction to Swiss courts in divorce matters at the 
domicile of the defendant, under certain conditions at the domicile of the plaintiff, and in 
rare circumstances at the place of origin located in Switzerland. Art. 65 (regarding indirect 
jurisdiction) provides for the recognition of foreign-country judgments if they have been 
rendered in the state of domicile or habitual residence, or in the national state, of either 
spouse, or if they are recognized in one of these states. Other examples of states favoring 
recognition: Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Egypt, France, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey. 
9 Ralf Michaels, Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment 
Conventions, DUKE L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. PAPER NO. 123, 30 (2006). 
10 Indirect jurisdiction: whether a foreign court can be considered, from the point of 
view of the country where recognition is sought, to have had a legitimate interest in 
exercising jurisdiction. Examples of mirror states are Argentina, Canada, Estonia, 
Germany, Japan, Korea, Morocco, Taiwan, USA. The mirror principle is also known in 
international treaties such as the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Parental 
Responsibility and Child Protection, http://goo.gl/bhZeLX. 
11 Direct jurisdiction: whether the own national courts are allowed to exercise 
jurisdiction in a situation involving international elements. 
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Illustration 1. Judgments Recognition Regimes Worldwide 
 
The United States numbers among the “mirroring” countries.12 In 
the United States, foreign-country judgments can only be recognized 
if the foreign court had jurisdiction to decide the case,13 which is 
examined using the same standards that would apply to U.S. courts 
when they exercise their own direct jurisdiction.14 
American authors usually present this regime as “liberal” and 
“fair.”15 It’s “tit for tat,” or “do as you would be done by.” Identical 
criteria for the recognition of foreign and sister-state judgments 
eliminate discrimination and set equal standards for all judgments. No 
more (and no less) is required from foreign courts than from the 
 
12 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 482 cmt. (1987): “a court in the 
United States asked to recognize a foreign judgment should scrutinize the basis for 
asserting jurisdiction” in light of United States rules governing jurisdiction to adjudicate. 
13 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
14 Cf. e.g., Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942, 943–44 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1981). 
15 Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International Litigation Guide: 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 491, 1 
(2013); Porterfield, supra note 4, at 83 (“more than fair treatment of foreign money 
judgments in American courts”). 
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country’s own local courts.16 If a country exercises its own 
jurisdiction in a specific situation, then it should also be willing to 
recognize foreign judgments that are based on the same criteria.17 And 
the mirror principle protects defendants against “undue” jurisdictional 
criteria, as judgments based on grounds of jurisdiction that are not 
accepted in the country of recognition simply are not recognized.18 
Despite these obvious advantages, the discussions in the Hague 
Conference have revealed that countries that apply the mirror 
principle are not necessarily as liberal as they claim. Indeed, there are 
two distinct subcategories amongst the “mirroring countries,” 
according to whether they use a national or an international mirror 
standard. 
In its international form, applied by nearly three quarters of all 
relevant countries, the mirror principle is used to mirror 
international19 grounds of jurisdiction—i.e., specific sets of 
jurisdictional rules developed for international situations.20 In 
contrast, a handful of countries, including the United States, go far 
beyond this ordinary mirror approach.21 In the United States, the 
national/interstate rules of direct jurisdiction are mirrored and used as 
rules of international direct and indirect jurisdiction.22 This uniform 
application of a single set of grounds of jurisdiction to both interstate 
and international situations makes the U.S. approach to judgments 
recognition one of the few outliers in international practice. 
  
 
16 MARTIN FRICKE, DIE AUTONOME ANERKENNUNGSZUSTÄNDIGKEITSREGEL IM 
DEUTSCHEN RECHT DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS 83 (1993). 
17 See MARTIN FRICKE, ANERKENNUNGSZUSTÄNDIGKEIT ZWISCHEN 
SPIEGELBILDGRUNDSATZ UND GENERALKLAUSEL 9 (Schriften zum deutschen und 
europäischen Zivil-, Handels- und Prozessrecht, Bd. 128, Gieseking 1990) (citing English 
cases stating that it seems “plain that our courts in this matter should recognize a 
jurisdiction which they themselves claim”). 
18 Id. at 87. 
19 In contrast to jurisdictional grounds used in an interstate or federal context. 
20 Such as Argentina, Israel, Italy, Japan. 
21 These countries are Canada, Mexico, Chile, Taiwan, and the United States. There 
does not seem to be a common denominator amongst these countries, as some federal 
states, such as Australia, apply other principles. 
22 Compare the following cases that use the criteria developed for direct jurisdiction in 
an interstate context (Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington et al., 326 U.S. 310 (1944)) in 
relationship with the recognition of foreign-country judgments. Monks Own, Ltd. v. 
Monastery of Christ In Desert, 168 P.3d 121, 123 (N.M. 2007); Koster v. Automark 
Industries, Inc., 640 F.2d 77, 78 (7th Cir. 1981); Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 
436 A.2d 942, 943 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). 
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Illustration 2. Judgments Recognition Regimes Worldwide: What is 
Mirrored? 
 
This difference in the mirror approach is not only conceptual or 
theoretical; it has real implications. Indeed, all jurisdictional rules are 
developed in a certain context and for a certain purpose. In an 
international context, importance needs to be given to predictability 
and party autonomy, and with respect to recognition of foreign-
country judgments, the focus of the rules lies on the acceptance of 
social facts created by foreign decisions, facts that should not be 
needlessly ignored or disputed.23 In contrast, interstate or national 
rules of jurisdiction are concerned less with the interests of the parties 
than with the distribution of jurisdictional power amongst federal 
territorial entities and the proper administration of justice. Applying 
such national rules to international situations can create mismatches, 
as different interests are at stake. More than thirty years ago, Justice 
Brennan argued in World-Wide Volkswagen24 with respect to the 
 
23 For example, although a country may not want to grant access to its authorities 
regarding marriage on its territory, it should recognize foreign marriages, except where the 
public policy of the state addressed would be violated, as otherwise the legal status of the 
couple involved would change every time the couple crosses the boarder. Cf. e.g., 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 121 (recognizing marriages validly celebrated 
everywhere). 
24 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 308−11 (1980). 
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application of national U.S. concepts of direct jurisdiction to 
international situations: 
 [T]hat principle,[25] with its almost exclusive focus on the rights 
of the defendant, may be outdated . . . Given the tremendous 
mobility of goods and people . . . I do not think that the defendant 
should be in complete control of the geographical stretch of his 
amenability to suit. . . . People should understand that they are held 
responsible for the consequences of their actions and that in our 
society most actions have consequences affecting many States.26 
This critique is all the more relevant with respect to foreign-
country judgments, where the same national concepts of jurisdiction 
are applied, although the interests at stake are different. It’s a 
miscarriage of justice that calls into question the “national” mirror 
principle as applied by the United States, and suggests that it should 
be restricted to grounds of jurisdiction that are appropriate in an 
international context. 
The approach proposed in this paper invites the “national mirror 
states” involved in negotiating the Hague Judgments Project to 
reconsider their positions and to accept grounds of jurisdiction that 
are different from their national, domestic ones. The United States 
could and should break the “jurisdictional chains of due process” and 
adopt a new, international approach better suited for international 
situations. Not only would the Judgments Project benefit from this 
shift, but also areas such as the recognition of maintenance 
judgments,27 where the problems related to the U.S. approach of 
indirect jurisdiction are especially acute. 
 
25 Editorial comment: Justice Brennan refers to the jurisdictional principle of Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. State of Washington et al., 326 U.S. 310 (minimum contacts test). This principle is 
applied in the United States also to the recognition of foreign-country judgments. Cf. 
Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942, 943 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1981) (“In determining whether the Italian court had jurisdiction we deem it appropriate to 
apply the minimum contacts test. . . . Although this test was developed to determine 
whether a judgment of a sister state is entitled to full faith and credit, it is equally 
applicable where a court of a foreign nation has exercised long-arm jurisdiction. See Bank 
of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467, 470-471 (9 Cir. 1980)”). 
26 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
27 According to the most recent working paper of the Judgments Project, maintenance 
judgments would not be covered by the Judgments Project, as they are already within the 
scope of application of the Child Maintenance Recovery Convention of 2007. However, 
this may still change, as some delegations propose to extend the Judgments Project also to 
maintenance claims. In any case, the underlying questions for both these instruments are 
the same: under which conditions should a foreign-country judgment be entitled to 
recognition abroad? 
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II 
RELEVANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
Recognition of foreign-country judgments is a real challenge in the 
United States, especially regarding maintenance judgments made in 
Europe, whose recognition is often denied for lack of jurisdiction.28 
This problem is not likely to change soon, despite the recent 
ratification (September 9, 2016) by the United States of the Hague 
Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of 
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance,29 as the 
United States made a reservation against the most important ground 
of jurisdiction in maintenance matters found in many international 
instruments and internal systems of maintenance recovery: the 
habitual residence of the maintenance creditor.30 
Each year in the United States, about 150,000 child support orders 
concern situations with one parent living abroad.31 Expressed in 
money terms, every year in the United States about $300 million in 
maintenance claims are related to international situations.32 Thus, 
recognition of foreign judgments is necessary to ensure that children’s 
claims to maintenance are protected. 
In order to illustrate the existing problems related to the 
recognition of foreign-country judgments in the United States, and to 
test various possible solutions, two fictitious cases based on situations 
involving the United States and Switzerland can serve as examples. 
Switzerland is a useful test case in relation to the United States, as it 
 
28 Sandra John, Überblick über Die Internationale Durchsetzung von 
Unterhaltsansprüchen Aus Dem Blickwinkel Der Zentralbehörde Für Internationale 
Alimentensachen Im Bundesamt Für Justiz, 2015/03 FAMPRA.CH 536, 547–49 (2015) 
(regarding the recognition of Swiss judgments in maintenance matters in the United 
States). 
29 Letter from Vicki Turetsky, Comm. Off. of Child Support, to All State & Tribal Dir., 
Re: Ratification of the Hague Child Support Convention, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css 
/resource/us-ratification-of-hague-child-support-convention (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
30 Reservation available under https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status  
-table/notifications/?csid=1016&disp=resdn (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
31 Roughly 1% of the yearly total number of 15 million United States child support 
orders. See https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/us-ratification-of-hague-child-support       
-convention (last visited on Apr. 29, 2016). 
32 Timothy S. Grail, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2009, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Dec. 2011, at 60, http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-240 
.pdf (explaining that 1% of the total sum of national child support due per year amounted 
to 35.1 billion dollars in 2009) (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
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is representative of many European countries33 without being 
influenced by the internal laws of the European Union. 
In the first example case, “Recognition in the U.S.,” a father is 
domiciled in the United States, while his child habitually resides in 
Switzerland, where she lives with her mother. All the parties are U.S. 
citizens. A Swiss court has issued a judgment condemning the father 
to pay $1000 of child maintenance per month. The father, who never 
set foot in Switzerland, was duly served with all court documents, but 
he never participated in the proceedings or reacted to any court 
document he received. Now recognition of this judgment is sought in 
the United States at the father’s domicile. 
Under the current legal situation, such a judgment would not be 
recognized in the United States, as the habitual residence of the 
creditor is not an accepted ground of jurisdiction.34 This refusal of a 
foreign-country judgment is an unforeseen consequence of the 
national mirror principle, which extends domestic jurisdictional 
principles, despite their purely national context, to international 
situations. In a domestic situation, a child with a domicile in State A 
cannot introduce a maintenance claim in his home state against his 
father domiciled in State B, because the Revised Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act of 1968 facilitates communication 
between courts throughout the United States and therefore renders 
jurisdiction at the domicile of the maintenance creditor unnecessary.35 
 
33 Most countries in the European Union and the European Free Trade Association have 
a forum at the domicile of the maintenance creditor, which the United States does not 
recognize. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2001). Therefore, the non-recognition of Swiss decisions can be used as a representative 
example for many European decisions, which face comparable difficulties when their 
recognition is sought in the United States. Although no official statistics are available 
regarding Switzerland, figures from surrounding countries such as Germany (where more 
than two thousand U.S.-German child support cases were pending in the year 2013; cf. 
Deutsches Institut für Jugendhilfe und Familienrecht (DIJuF) e.V. Forum für Fachfragen, 
Geschäftsbericht für die Berichtsjahr 2012/2013, DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR JUGENDHILFE 
UND FAMILIENRECHT (2014), https://www.dijuf.de/tl_files/downloads/2015/Geschaefts 
bericht_2012-2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (suggesting that there is also a 
significant number of cases involving the United States and Switzerland). A conservative 
estimate would indicate at least one hundred pending cases every year. 
34 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, supra note 33. For judgments after 
January 1, 2017: US reservation against article 20 paragraph 1 letter c of the Hague Child 
Support and Maintenance Convention. 
35 Kulko v. Superior Court of California In & For City and Cty. of San Francisco, 436 
U.S. 84, 86 (1978) (“California’s legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children 
residing in California without unduly disrupting the children’s lives is already being 
served by the State’s participation in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act  
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Due to the mirror principle, jurisdiction at the domicile of the creditor 
is also excluded in international situations, although the procedural 
simplifications of the Act of 1968 only apply amongst sister-states.36 
This leaves maintenance creditors domiciled abroad without 
appropriate legal protection, as both recognition of foreign judgments 
and administrative court-cooperation between the United States and 
foreign courts are excluded. Such negative international consequences 
were never intended and do not reflect a political choice, but are 
rather the product of jurisdictional policies that focus on a federal 
context and that are inappropriate for international situations.37 Even 
though the situation has slightly improved since January 2017, due to 
the entry into force in the United States of the Hague Child Support 
and Maintenance Convention which provides for administrative help 
for foreign creditors,38 the main problem remains, as the United States 
made a reservation against the ground of jurisdiction of the domicile 
of the child.39 Judgments rendered at the domicile of the child will not 
be recognized in the United States. 
In the second example, “Recognition in Switzerland,” a father is 
domiciled in Switzerland, while his child has her habitual residence in 
the United States, where she lives with her mother. All the parties are 
U.S. citizens. Before the father moved to Switzerland, they were 
living in the United States, where conception took place.40 This 
element is important, as it allows U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over defendants even if they reside abroad.41 After the father’s 
 
of 1968, which permits a California resident claiming support from a nonresident to file a 
petition in California and have its merits adjudicated in the State of the alleged obligor’s 
residence, without either party’s having to leave his or her own State.”). 
36 See the scope of application of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act which facilitates interstate communication between United States authorities. 
37 Michaels, supra note 9, at 10 (explaining that grounds for indirect jurisdiction 
(recognition) should not be compared to direct national grounds of jurisdiction because 
there is no link between them). 
38 See art. 5 and 6 of the Hague Maintenance Convention of 2007, https://www.hcch 
.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=131. 
39 The Judgments Project: Special Comm. On the Judgments Project, https://www.hcch 
.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
40 This is an acceptable basis for jurisdiction in the United States. See, e.g., Phillips v. 
Fallen, 6 S.W.3d 862 (Miss. 1999) (finding jurisdiction over nonresidents if the defendant 
submitted to it by doing “the act of sexual intercourse within this state with respect to 
which a child may have been conceived”). 
41 Section 201 of the UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT provides for the 
recognition of judgments from a foreign judicial district where “the individual [defendant]  
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departure, a maintenance claim was introduced in the United States, 
and the U.S. court issued a judgment condemning the father to pay 
$1000 of child maintenance per month. The father was duly served 
with all court documents, but he never participated in the proceedings. 
Recognition of this judgment is sought in Switzerland at the domicile 
of the father. According to Art. 84 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private 
International Law,42 such a decision can be recognized in Switzerland: 
“Foreign decisions relating to the relationship between parents and 
child [including maintenance claims] shall be recognized in 
Switzerland if they were rendered in the state of the child’s habitual 
residence.” From a Swiss perspective, it does not matter which 
ground of jurisdiction was used by the foreign court, as long as the 
criterion “rendered in the state of the child’s habitual residence” is 
fulfilled. 
In the two example cases, U.S. decisions would be recognized in 
Switzerland, but Swiss decisions would not be recognized in the 
United States. This result leaves creditors domiciled abroad without 
appropriate legal protection and unduly overprotects debtors in the 
United States, which was never intended as the historical analysis of 
the due process clause indicates. 
III 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. From Review on the Merits to Control of Indirect Jurisdiction 
Before the entry into force of the U.S. Constitution, the American 
colonies were foreign nations in relation to one another. They were 
free to exercise jurisdiction in cases with hardly any link to their 
territory.43 In return, recognition of judgments from neighboring 
colonies depended on the goodwill of each colony.44 The merits 
(facts) of these judgments from neighboring colonies were entirely re-
 
engaged in sexual intercourse . . . and the child may have been conceived by that act of 
intercourse.” 
42 See BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG], supra note 
8. 
43 Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 485, 498 (2012), cites a case where “the mere attachment of a blanket, 
reputed to be [the defendant’s] property” was used in order to establish jurisdiction. 
44 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181 (1895); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical 
Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485, 495 (2012). 
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examinable,45 and the judgments were only considered an implied 
promise to pay money, or as prima facie evidence of a debt.46 Non-
local judgments had no more force than a contract.47 If foreign 
decisions were recognized at all, they were viewed only as defenses. 
The courts’ reluctance to enforce foreign decisions stemmed from a 
desire to prevent the enforcement of potentially unjust laws.48 
As the non-recognition of judgments from neighboring colonies 
hampered economic activities, the decision was made, first in some 
colonies, and later throughout the country by means of the federal 
Constitution, to facilitate their recognition. Based on Article IV of the 
U.S. Constitution, which provides that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be 
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of every other state,”49 some early federal judgments held 
that all sister-state judgments had to be recognized without control of 
jurisdiction.50 This rule applied even to default judgments not relying 
upon an accepted ground of jurisdiction.51 
A duty to recognize sister-state judgments without examining their 
basis for jurisdiction can have undesired effects, such as the 
recognition of abusive fora contradicting local exclusive jurisdiction 
in violation of the forum rei sitae principle52 regarding immovable 
property. For this reason, from the beginning, state courts were 
reluctant to give unconditional recognition to sister-state judgments 
 
45 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 181. 
46 Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 
1214 (2009). 
47 Id. at 1213. 
48 Arnaud Nuyts, Due Process and Fair Trial: Jurisdiction in the United States and in 
Europe Compared, 2 CILE STUDIES: PRIVATE LAW, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, & 
JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU-US RELATIONSHIP 27, 31−44 (2005). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
50 Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481 (1813); Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 
268, 267–77 (1935) (“The very purpose of the full-faith and credit clause was to alter the 
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore 
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make 
them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation 
might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.”). See also Williams 
v. State of N. Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 
U.S. at 292 (1980); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 413, 428 (Ky. Ct. App. 1808). 
51 Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. 234, 235 (1818). 
52 According to this principle, the court (latin: forum) where an object (latin: res, rei) is 
located (latin: sitae) should be the one to decide on this object, as it’s the court with the 
closest link to the object, especially when immoveable property is concerned. 
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and created some limits. They only recognized judgments “where 
both parties are within the jurisdiction of such courts at the time of 
commencing the suit, and are duly served with the process.”53 
Following legal doctrine and the case law of state courts,54 the 
Supreme Court recognized in 1850 in D’Arcy that “great 
embarrassment” would result if sister-state judgments had to be 
recognized without exceptions.55 D’Arcy established that control of 
indirect jurisdiction would be performed by the court addressed, 
which would inquire whether the sister-state court that rendered the 
judgment had been entitled to do so: “[A] judgment entered without 
jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit.”56 The criteria for 
jurisdiction are set out in the due process clause,57 which is interpreted 
 
53 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (1787); Rogers, 3 Ky. (Hard.) at 413; see also James 
Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for 
Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 193 (2004). The legislative proceedings and 
comparisons with language used in evidentiary legislation demonstrate that in the 18th 
century, the term “full faith and credit” was not used in the context of recognition of 
judgments, but rather for the credibility attached to public documents, such as notary 
deeds, etc. This indicates that the full faith and credit clause was only intended to regulate 
evidence questions, not the recognition of judgments, allowing states to subject the 
recognition of sister-state judgments to some limitations. Cf. Sachs, supra note 46, at 
1223–40; cf. also Weinstein, supra, at 178–81. 
54 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 261 (1840); see cases cited supra 
note 53. 
55 D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 175 (1850). 
56 Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 98 A.3d 998, 
1007 (D.C. 2014). 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The constitutional rules on jurisdiction are specified 
by case law and the statutes of the states, which determine the recognition of judgments 
from sister-states and foreign countries. Some uniformity amongst the states has been 
achieved, as nearly two-thirds of them have enacted either the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 or the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act of 2005. See FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION 
ACT SUMMARY, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx 
?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act (last visited on 
Apr. 29, 2016). These statutes must comply with the constitutional due process 
requirement in Smith v. DeWalt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1984). In the 
states that have not enacted specific statutes, recognition of judgments is based on case 
law, with similar criteria all throughout the country. Courts in these states generally adhere 
to the interpretation as provided in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States. Cf. Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments 
Recognition Law, 2015–37 U. OF PITTSBURGH LEGAL STUDS. RES. PAPER 21 (2015) 
(2015); Brand, supra note 15, at 494. 
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by the U.S. Supreme Court as requiring that the defendant had 
“certain minimum contacts” with the foreign forum.58 
B. Indirect Jurisdiction as an Alternative to a Review on the Merits 
The debate regarding indirect jurisdiction developed at the time 
when full faith and credit was introduced for sister-state judgments.59 
This indicates that control of indirect jurisdiction was conceived as an 
alternative to a review on the merits, which would also have provided 
protection against unacceptable results arising from the exercise of 
judicial power.60 
The link between examination on the merits and indirect 
jurisdiction is supported by the fact that judgments from admiralty 
courts, i.e., courts that applied a universally homogenous law, were 
largely recognized without control on the merits or examination of 
indirect jurisdiction. “A foreign court . . . might apply an uncivilized 
and barbarous law. . . . Such reasoning explains why courts were 
more willing to . . . recognize the judgments of foreign admiralty 
courts, which all theoretically applied the same international law of 
admiralty.”61 As the laws these courts applied were considered to be 
appropriate, there was no need to examine their judicial legitimacy. In 
areas where the substantive laws are harmonized, questions of 
jurisdiction become less important.62 
Another fact supports the intrinsic link between indirect 
jurisdiction and control on the merits. Countries that reviewed foreign 
judgments on the merits were in general also less demanding with 
respect to the control of indirect jurisdiction. In Belgium, until 
 
58 The criteria developed in Int’l Shoe are also used for indirect jurisdiction. Cf. e.g., 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958) (regarding indirect jurisdiction which 
nevertheless explicitly applies Int’l Shoe); cf. also cases cited supra note 22, 25. 
59 Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 4 (1885) (“Judgments recovered in one state of the 
Union . . . [are not] re-examinable upon the merits, nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining 
them, if rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties.”). 
60 FRICKE, supra note 16, at 36–37 (The examination of foreign indirect jurisdiction is 
directly linked to the applicable law (and the examination of the merits of the case). Either 
the law applied on the merits is examined, or the jurisdiction of the foreign court is 
controlled in order to ensure that the law applied represents enough links with the case.). 
61 Sachs, supra note 46, at 1215. 
62 A.N. Makarov, Internationales Privatrecht. Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, 10 
JURISTENZEITUNG 22, 718–19 (1955); Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1047 (2005). 
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recently, foreign judgments were examinable on the substance, and in 
turn only exorbitant indirect grounds of jurisdiction were controlled.63 
Belgium has now changed its laws and no longer reviews foreign 
cases on the merits, but it now reviews the indirect jurisdiction of 
foreign courts in a stricter way.64 
The link between review on the merits and indirect jurisdiction is 
an important finding in the present context. If the real question at 
stake with indirect jurisdiction is control on the merits in order to 
prevent giving effects to “uncivilized and barbarous” laws, then the 
application of the criteria developed for direct jurisdiction is not 
appropriate with respect to the recognition of foreign decisions.65 On 
an international scale, the applicable laws can vary substantially. 
Which law applies in a proceeding is determined by the judgment 
state, and this determination is recognized or refused according to the 
grounds of indirect jurisdiction of the state where the judgment is 
enforced. Thus, grounds of jurisdiction have an indirect influence on 
substantive laws, as the latter are indirectly determined by the former. 
This militates against the uncontrolled extension of domestic 
jurisdictional principles to international situations. Yet, this is exactly 
what happened in the United States. 
C. Extension of Due Process Requirements to Foreign-Country 
Judgments 
Recognition of judgments from foreign countries initially 
developed differently from sister-state judgments. At the time when 
the full faith and credit clause was introduced, “it was the intention of 
 
63 See CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Judicial Code] art. 570 (Belg.) of Oct. 10, 1967, 
MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Oct. 31, 1967; see also P. Jenard, 
Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968), 4 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. 
COMMUNITIES 59, Mar. 5, 1979 (regarding judgments recognition in Belgium in the 
1970s. “Where there is no reciprocal convention, a court seised of an application for an 
order for enforcement has jurisdiction over a foreign judgment as to both form and 
substance, and can re-examine both the facts and the law. In other words, it has power to 
review the matter fully”). 
64 Cf. LOI PORTANT LE CODE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [Belgium Code of 
private international law] of July 16, 2004, para. 25 in conjunction with paras. 39, 57, 72, 
95, 115, and 121. 
65 Foreign-country judgments might have applied substantive laws largely different 
from local ones, and thus need a different control than sister-state judgments. Grounds of 
direct jurisdiction, which follow procedural interests such as the good and efficient 
administration of the justice system, are of no help when applied to foreign judgments, 
where the main interest is the recognition of social facts created abroad. 
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our own legislature, and also of the federal government, to place the 
judgments recovered in any of the courts of the United States on 
better ground than judgments rendered in any other state or 
country.”66 The differences between foreign and sister-state 
judgments were two-fold: regarding the requirements, and regarding 
the effects of recognition. 
Regarding the requirements of recognition of foreign-country 
judgments in the United States, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
stated in Bissell that, “[i]f the foreign court, which rendered the 
judgment, had jurisdiction of the cause. . .”67 it can be recognized. 
Regarding sister-state judgments however: “A court of another state 
must have had jurisdiction of the parties, as well as of the cause, for 
its judgment to be entitled to the full faith and credit mentioned in the 
federal Constitution.”68 Thus, it seems that foreign-country judgments 
were subject to a different, less strict jurisdictional test (jurisdiction of 
the cause) than sister-state judgments (jurisdiction of the cause and of 
the parties). 
This less demanding scrutiny for foreign titles compared to sister-
state judgments can be explained by the fact that initially, different 
effects were attached to their recognition. Only sister-state judgments 
were recognized without review on the merits (in exchange for the 
full review of indirect jurisdiction), whereas foreign judgments with 
their more limited review of indirect jurisdiction remained subject to 
an inquiry regarding the merits.69 
 
66 Hanley, 116 U.S. at 4. 
67 Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 464 (Mass. 1813) (emphasis added). 
68 Id. at 462 (emphasis added). In the nineteenth century, “jurisdiction of the cause” 
was to be understood as the subject-matter competence, given, e.g., if the cause exceeded 
certain sums or values of money, Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U.S. 33, 34 (1830), or in diversity 
cases for federal courts, Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. 164, 171 (1838), whereas 
“jurisdiction of the parties” referred to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; see 
TIMOTHY BROWN, COMMENTARIES ON THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS (1891). 
69 Bissell, 9 Mass. at 462 (“If such judgment be produced to obtain execution of it here, 
and the court rendering it had jurisdiction of the cause, yet it is still open to an inquiry into 
its merits.”). The situation may be compared to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Germany, where indirect jurisdiction of foreign decisions was not seen as a requirement 
for recognition, but rather as a condition of validity of the original judgment, and thus, 
examined according to the standards of the court of origin. If the court lacked jurisdiction 
according to its own criteria, the judgments was considered to be void. Only exorbitant 
jurisdiction was examined according to the standards of the court addressed. Cf. Dieter 
Martiny, Anerkennung Ausländischer Entscheidungen Nach Autonomem Recht, 1 
HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS ¶ 602 (1984). 
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Since then, the situation has changed a lot regarding the 
recognition of foreign judgments. Today, “[t]he foreign judgment is 
enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister[-]state, 
which is entitled to full faith and credit.”70 “[T]he merits of the case 
should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be 
tried afresh.”71 In compensation for these more favorable procedure 
and effects, judgments from foreign countries are nowadays also 
subject to the same criteria as sister-state judgments regarding indirect 
jurisdiction.72 Indirect jurisdiction is considered to be in compliance 
with due process when there is a “relationship among the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation,”73 which means that the U.S. criteria for 
indirect jurisdiction are identical to those used for the exercise of 
direct jurisdiction by U.S. courts.74 Thus, today, all jurisdictional 
questions receive the same inquiry in the United States: “whether it be 
Wisconsin or the Netherlands, the standard of minimum contacts is 
the same.”75 
IV 
INAPPROPRIATENESS OF U.S. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-COUNTRY 
JUDGMENTS 
The application of a single set of criteria to the questions of direct 
and indirect jurisdiction regarding both sister-state and foreign-
country judgments is inappropriate for: (A) procedural reasons, (B) 
because of the federal origin of the direct grounds of jurisdiction 
mirrored for the use in international situations, and (C) due to the 
 
70 § 3 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 7 UNIF. FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT. 
71 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 203. 
72 Compare the following cases regarding national and international indirect 
jurisdiction that refer to the same standards developed in Int’l Shoe: Mercandino, Inc., 436 
A.2d at 943; Koster, 640 F.2d at 78; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 291; 
Monks Own, Ltd., 168 P.3d at 127; Frank E. Basil, Inc. v. Guardino, 424 A.2d 70, 74 (D.C. 
1980). 
73 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). 
74 Mercandino, 436 A.2d at 942. 
75 Koster, 640 F.2d at 79; Mercandino, 436 A.2d at 943–44 (“Although this [minimum 
contacts] test was developed to determine whether a judgment of a sister state is entitled to 
full faith and credit, it is equally applicable where a court of a foreign nation has exercised 
long-arm jurisdiction. . . . In either instance, the minimum contacts standard provides 
assurance that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’ International Shoe Co. v. Washington.”); see also Bank of 
Montreal, 612 F.2d at 470. 
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vagueness of the main criterion used for direct jurisdiction in the 
United States. A particularly telling example of the inappropriateness 
of applying federal grounds of jurisdiction to international situations 
is tag jurisdiction. 
A. Procedural Differences Between U.S. and International 
Situations 
The United States has a plaintiff-friendly procedural system. 
Contingency fees lower the cost-entry barriers for plaintiffs, pre-trial 
discovery proceedings with horrendous costs force defendants to 
settle and therefore advantage plaintiffs, jury trials tend to award high 
punitive damages to plaintiffs, and there is no risk of having to pay 
defendant’s attorney fees, as these costs are not considered to be 
damages.76 In this plaintiff-friendly setup, the defendant needs some 
protection, in that he is only subject to jurisdiction if he himself 
established minimum contacts with the court. This explains why 
following International Shoe, “the relationship among the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive 
sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became 
the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”77 
Most European rules of jurisdiction, in contrast, do not require in 
addition to the traditional requirement of contact between the court 
and the case a protective link between the court and the defendant, 
because their setup is not as plaintiff-friendly as in the United States. 
In many European countries, for example, securities must be paid by 
the plaintiff for the probable party costs of the defendant, which 
protects the defendant against abusive or frivolous proceedings.78 
Furthermore, many European countries don’t have pre-trial discovery 
proceedings.79 These differences protect the defendant, as the plaintiff 
has to gather some evidence before he can initiate a lawsuit; and 
punitive damages and contingency fees are prohibited, in order to 
 
76 Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American 
Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 9, 37 (1996); cf. Michaels, supra 
note 9, at 1054–55. 
77 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. 
78 See, e.g., art. 98 of the Swiss Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Code] 
Dec. 19, 2008, SR 272 (Switz.): “The court may demand that the plaintiff make an 
advance payment up to the amount of the expected court costs.” 
79 See, e.g., title 10 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, supra note 78. 
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prevent speculative judicial proceedings.80 Because of the defendant-
friendly procedural set-up characteristic of many European legal 
regimes, there is no need for a special constitutional due process 
requirement that would protect the defendant against undue lawsuits. 
In the aforementioned example, “Recognition in U.S. Case,” 
during the proceedings in Switzerland the defendant would have the 
right to be heard; he could request that the plaintiff provide security 
for the defendant’s attorney fees; he could ask for free legal aid (e.g., 
representation by a Swiss attorney) if he does not have sufficient 
financial resources,81 and secure the assistance of an English 
interpreter.82 He could be exempted from being present in court due to 
the long distance, and all court documents would be transmitted to 
him according to internationally accepted standards.83 The plaintiff 
would have to advance the costs for obtaining the evidence that she 
requires (e.g., a DNA test in order to prove paternity), and if the 
plaintiff loses she has to pay all the costs, including the defendant’s 
expenses and the costs of translation/interpretation.84 In addition, 
Swiss courts would apply a law according to conflict-of-laws 
principles that are internationally recognized as being fair.85 
Despite all these defendant-friendly rules, which favor the U.S. 
defendant, the Swiss judgment would not be recognized in the United 
States because it would be considered to violate the due process rights 
of the defendant due to the missing link between the court and the 
defendant. Under these circumstances, the due process requirement 
becomes a purely formalistic criterion, deprived of any substantive 
meaning. 
 
80 Schlosser, supra note 76. 
81 See, e.g., art. 117 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, supra note 80: “A person is 
entitled to legal aid if: (a) he or she does not have sufficient financial resources; and (b) his 
or her case does not seem devoid of any chances of success.” 
82 See art. 95 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, supra note 78: translation costs are not 
party costs, but court costs, which have to be borne by the unsuccessful party. 
83 Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and Switzerland are 
parties. 
84 Swiss Civil Procedure Code, supra note 78, Art. 53: The parties have the right to be 
heard; art. 99: Security for party costs; Art. 102 Advance for taking of evidence; Art. 106 
General principles of allocation, Art. 117: Entitlement to legal aid. 
85 Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance 
Obligations, ratified by Switzerland. 
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B. Federal Context 
The principles developed under the due process and full faith and 
credit clauses protect a broad variety of interests,86 such as “the 
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”87 These 
American grounds focus on the relationship between the court and the 
defendant,88 without considering the situation of the plaintiff, who 
may be protected in his rights if he lives in the United States,89 but not 
if he lives abroad. They are unilateral, as they are based on territorial 
interests of the United States, which do not take into account foreign 
interests.90 And they focus, at least implicitly, on the delimitation of 
powers in a federal system. 
These federal reasons behind the American principles of direct 
jurisdiction are of course irrelevant when the question of the 
recognition of a foreign-country judgment is at stake. The reason that 
many countries have different sets of jurisdictional grounds for local 
and for international situations, as well as for direct and for indirect 
jurisdiction, is precisely because these situations are different.91 For 
 
86 Michaels, supra note 9, at 1030; Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the 
International Order Begins, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1237 (1997). 
87 Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 
102, 113 (1987); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (1980). 
88 Michaels, supra note 9, at 1030. In many other countries, such as in the European 
Union, jurisdiction is on the contrary more focused on the parties—an approach that can 
be described as horizontal where jurisdictional grounds determine, e.g., where the plaintiff 
can sue the defendant. Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels-Ibis-Regulation), 2012 O.J. (L 
351/1) (EU). This may be due to the fact that continental European law, with its principle 
of actor sequitur forum rei, is traditionally more focused on the protection of the defendant 
and must therefore provide for some reliefs for the benefit of the plaintiff. In the traditional 
European approach, consideration is also given to the protection of weak parties, who 
might benefit from a jurisdictional ground based on social considerations. 
89 See Michaels, supra note 9, at 1030. 
90 Michaels, supra note 9, at 1031. 
91 For an example of a foreign law which provides for special grounds of indirect 
jurisdiction particularly for international situations, compare Swiss Federal Act on Private 
International Law (supra note 8), Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 149 (Switz.): (1) Foreign 
decisions relating to a right pertaining to the law of obligations shall be recognized in 
Switzerland: (a) if they were rendered in the state of the defendant’s domicile; or (b) if 
they were rendered in the state of the defendant’s habitual residence, insofar as the rights 
relate to an activity carried out in such state. (2) They shall also be recognized: (a) if the 
decision pertains to a contractual obligation, was rendered in the State of performance of  
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instance, the Brussels I Regulation92 regarding the recognition of 
judgments in the European Union has not been mirrored and extended 
to third states (extra-EU cases) in part because to do so would be to 
apply inappropriate criteria to the recognition of third-country 
judgments.93 
In the United States, by contrast, because of the mirror principle, 
the very same jurisdictional concepts that are used in the federal 
context are also applied to situations involving foreign countries,94 
despite their inappropriateness. This is contrary to the original intent 
and purpose behind those rules.95 The American system excludes, for 
example, a forum for child maintenance at the domicile of the child,96 
making the plaintiff the procedural victim of due process. Likewise, 
no forum for product liability exists under American law in the place 
where an accident took place and where the victim lived,97 thus 
depriving the latter from legal protection if the defendant did not 
somehow avail himself of the benefits of the forum and could 
therefore be submitted to U.S. jurisdiction on that basis of purposeful 
availment.98 
Such an extension of the American constitutional rules regarding 
jurisdiction from the domestic to international situations was never 
intended.99 Until the beginning of the twentieth century (more 
specifically until International Shoe), it was established that the 
constitutional prescriptions regarding jurisdiction did not apply to 
 
the characteristic obligation and the defendant was not domiciled in Switzerland; [(b)−(f) 
omitted]. 
92 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12/1), now replaced by Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012 (Brussels-Ibis-Regulation), 2012 O.J. (L 351/1). 
93 European Parliament, Possibility and Terms for Applying Brussels I Regulation 
(recast) to Extra-EU Disputes, Study PE 493.024 (2014) 40, www.europarl.europa.eu 
/studies (direct link: http://goo.gl/HGknzZ) (last visited Apr. 29, 2016): 
In summary, we do not see valid and convincing reasons to override the existing 
separate private international law treatment of intra-EU cases and that of extra-EU 
cases. There are, in our opinion, important reasons—a different constellation of 
interests and differing considerations as to access to justice—to maintain the 
distinction. 
94 Mercandino, 436 A.2d 942: the U.S. criteria for indirect jurisdiction are identical to 
those used for the exercise of direct jurisdiction by U.S. courts. 
95 Michaels, supra note 9, at 1035–36. 
96 Kulko, 436 U.S. at 84. 
97 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102. 
98 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. 
99 Strauss, supra note 86, at 1250–51. 
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international cases and were limited to the territorial boundaries of the 
state.100 Insisting on identical criteria for direct and indirect grounds 
of jurisdiction, while accepting differences in the applicable 
substantive laws if the choice-of-law rules designate foreign statutes, 
does not seem coherent. The interests of the parties are more affected 
by differences in substantive laws (for instance, whether and how 
much maintenance one has to pay), rather than by procedural or 
jurisdictional questions (such as, in which country the maintenance 
claim of the child is decided). Putting this dichotomy in the style of a 
well-known quotation: for an accused, it is more important to know 
whether he will be hanged, rather than where his sentence is 
delivered.101 Continuing with this metaphor, the current U.S. approach 
accepts differences in substantive laws (i.e., the hanging), as long as 
the hanging was decided where the defendant “engaged in sexual 
intercourse”102 (i.e., control of jurisdiction)—a disturbing idea of due 
process. 
C. Practical Problems: Vagueness and Unpredictability of the 
Minimum Contacts Test 
The application of the same jurisdictional criteria to both 
direct/interstate and indirect/international jurisdictional questions is 
problematic because of the vagueness of the International Shoe 
criterion: “certain minimum contacts.”103 This criterion, which 
requires certain minimum contacts among court, case, and defendant, 
in order for a court to be allowed to exercise jurisdiction,104 does not 
prevent overlapping jurisdictions, as minimum contacts could exist 
with different states at the same time. 
Such a vague delimitation of jurisdiction is acceptable amongst 
federal states, where the identification of a precise court becomes less 
important because of the full faith and credit status of the courts 
 
100 See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.Cas 609, 611 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (“Even the court 
of king’s bench in England, though a court of general jurisdiction, never imagined, that it 
could serve process in Scotland, Ireland, or the colonies, to compel an appearance, or 
justify a judgment against persons residing therein at the time of the commencement of the 
suit.”); Strauss, supra note 86, at 1250–53. 
101 Example given by Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978). 
102 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
103 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. 
104 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186. 
MEIER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2017  8:03 AM 
74 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18, 51 
involved. Regardless of where in the federal republic the judgment 
will have been rendered, it will be recognized everywhere, as long as 
some minimal contacts existed. In addition, amongst sister-states, 
mutual trust exists: all sister-state courts are considered to meet the 
basic criteria of procedural fairness, as they are all bound by the U.S. 
Constitution. Therefore, jurisdictional grounds developed in a federal 
context can focus on enabling access to court by using broad and 
imprecise criteria such as “minimum contacts.” Indeed, within the 
United States, it is less important where exactly the court is located, 
as the due process guaranties under the Constitution will ensure a fair 
trial. 
In contrast, in an international context an imprecise delimitation of 
jurisdictional power is inadequate, as the question becomes one of 
localization and legal certainty.105 The International Shoe test, while 
appropriate in a federal context, does not provide for this much-
needed legal certainty in international situations, and therefore seems 
inappropriate for use in an international context. 
D. Example: Inappropriateness of Tag-Jurisdiction in International 
Situations 
One ground of jurisdiction particularly inappropriate in an 
international context, due to its profound link to federalism, is 
jurisdiction based on the exercise of sovereign power. Whereas this 
power was ensured by physical arrest in ancient times,106 it now 
suffices to serve process on the defendant (tag-jurisdiction).107 In the 
United States, service of process has become necessary108 and 
sufficient109 for a court to establish jurisdiction, a principle that is also 
applied regarding the recognition of foreign judgments.110 
In a federal context amongst states that have mutual trust in the 
legitimacy of each other’s actions, jurisdiction defined by the exercise 
 
105 Strauss, supra note 86, at 1257. 
106 Michaels, supra note 9, at 1028; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 450 (1834). 
107 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917); Michaels, supra note 9, at 1028; 
Weinstein, supra note 53, at 204. 
108 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
109 Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 610−16 
(1990). 
110 According to article 5 of the UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS 
RECOGNITION ACT, a foreign judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of 
personal jurisdiction if “the defendant was served with process personally in the foreign 
country.” 
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of physical power can be mutually recognized. Simple rules such as 
tag-jurisdiction help to “bind these mutually jealous states into a 
nation.”111 The mutual acceptance of jurisdiction based on the 
exercise of sovereignty gives states real power inside their borders 
and a corresponding incentive to respect the identical prerogatives of 
their sister-states. 
On an international level however, jurisdiction based on the mere 
exercise of power is less appropriate. There is no mutual trust among 
foreign countries, and therefore states have to protect the legitimate 
interests of their citizens against the abusive use of jurisdiction by 
foreign states. One’s short and temporary presence in a jurisdiction 
should not give a court competence without any further contacts to 
the place, as this hampers foreseeability, legal certainty, and hinders 
international affairs. But according to the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act, American courts can base jurisdiction merely on service 
of process. According to Section 201, “in a proceeding to establish, or 
enforce, or modify a support order . . . , a tribunal of this State may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual . . . if: (1) 
the individual is personally served with [citation, summons, notice] 
within this State.” 
V 
SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW SCHEME OF JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION 
A. Developing an International Notion of Jurisdictional Due 
Process 
Due process in the United States has two aspects. It ensures 
procedural fairness in trial (independence and impartiality of judges, 
right to be heard before a court, etc.), and guarantees jurisdictional 
appropriateness of the court (a court has jurisdiction if the defendant 
is physically present, or if he purposefully availed112 himself of the 
protections of the forum). 
Some U.S. decisions have already recognized the necessity of 
adapting the procedural aspects of due process to international 
contexts, instead of applying them directly. As an example, a foreign 
judgment rendered by a judge without a jury-trial does not 
 
111 James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial 
Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 3 (1992). 
112 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 235. 
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automatically offend the American notion of due process, even if a 
jury would have been necessary had the trial taken place in the United 
States. The decisive criterion in these cases of “international due 
process”113 is the fundamental fairness of the foreign procedure, 
which can be guaranteed even without a jury trial. 
A similar approach should be taken regarding the jurisdictional 
implications of due process when the recognition of foreign-country 
judgments is at stake. Instead of requiring an additional link to the 
defendant, the due process criteria should be adapted to international 
situations and limited to the control of the legitimacy of the foreign 
court in exercising its jurisdictional power, based on a sufficient link 
between court and case. “[T]he State in which the injury occurred 
would seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort 
claim.”114 The protection of the defendant’s legitimate interests in the 
foreign procedure can be ensured by a procedural, rather than a 
jurisdictional control, in which it would be up to the defendant to 
demonstrate that he did not benefit from a fair trial abroad, just as the 
current U.S. laws already require him to establish a prima facie case if 
he invoked a public policy violation regarding substantive laws.115 
B. Focusing on the Contacts of the Case Instead of the Defendant 
Countries such as France116 and Canada117 have a judgments 
recognition requirement similar to the U.S. standard of “minimum 
contacts,” but instead of asking for a “relationship among the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation,”118 it is enough in Canada to 
 
113 Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000); Osorio v. Dole Food 
Co., 665 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009); The Society of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F.Supp.2d 
632 (N.D. Tex. 2001). This notion is not international by its source, but by its orientation, 
the same way as each country has its own set of “international” grounds of jurisdiction, 
i.e., rules that determine when a national court is entitled to decide a case containing 
international elements. 
114 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., 564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although 
this quote refers to direct jurisdiction in an international context, it also applies to indirect 
jurisdiction with respect to the recognition of foreign-country judgments; compare 
footnote 25 and the reference to Mercandino, where the standards of Int’l Shoe are applied 
to a recognition case. 
115 Steven Winterbauer, Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy: A Brief 
Overview of an Evolving Claim, 13 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 386, 392 (1992). 
116 Simitch, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], Chambre 
civile 1, 83-11.241, Bull. I N. 55 [1985] (Fr.). 
117 Morguard Investments Ltd v. De Savoye (1990), 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Ca.); Beals v. 
Saldanha (2003), 3 S.C.R. 416 (Ca.). 
118 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. 
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show “a real and substantial connection between the State of origin 
and the facts on which the proceeding was based.”119 This flexible 
approach without focus on the defendant could also be used in the 
United States for the recognition of foreign-country judgments. 
Applied to the aforementioned “Recognition in the U.S.” case, it is 
undeniable that there is a strong link between the case and the courts 
of Switzerland, as it is there that the child, who is more vulnerable 
than the adult maintenance debtor, lives and where her monetary 
needs can best be evaluated. The court has a legitimate interest in 
exercising jurisdiction, which therefore should be recognized in the 
United States. This interest can differ from the local American 
conception, but this difference should not prevent recognition, just as 
differences in the substantive laws of the state of origin and the state 
addressed are no impediment to recognition. Recognition should only 
be refused if the defendant can demonstrate that he did not benefit 
from a fair process abroad, not by simply indicating that the foreign 
grounds of jurisdiction differed from those known in the United 
States. 
C. Defining Specific Grounds of Jurisdiction for International 
Situations 
Instead of a flexible notion of international due process on a case-
by-case basis, jurisdictional criteria could also be defined in a general 
manner for each type of judgment. Regarding maintenance, 
recognition could for example be accepted if “the creditor was 
habitually resident in the State of origin at the time proceedings were 
instituted,”120 which would allow recognition of the Swiss judgment 
 
119 ART. 8 CANADIAN UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (2003); cf. 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN 29 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 31 (Mark 
Moedritzer & Kay Whittaker eds., 2014) (“A court in Canada would consider whether the 
court of the country where the judgment was issued had personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. However, there is no necessary requirement to show that the foreign court . . . 
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A Canadian court asked to recognise and 
enforce a foreign judgment would apply the factors relevant to whether there was shown to 
be a real and substantial connection between the cause of action and the country in which 
the foreign judgment was issued.”). 
 One explanation for this difference compared to the United States may be a less 
plaintiff-favoring approach of Canadian law, rendering the protective link between court 
and case unnecessary. 
120 Such a ground of jurisdiction is mentioned in art. 20 of the Hague Convention of 23 
November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of  
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in the “Recognition in the U.S.” case. Regarding tort claims, a 
judgment could e.g. be recognized if “the judgment ruled on an 
obligation arising from death, physical injury, . . . and the act or 
omission directly causing such harm occurred in the State of the court 
of origin of the judgment.”121 This would improve legal certainty and 
therefore reduce litigation costs. 
Another interesting approach for judgments recognition would be a 
general acceptance of foreign decisions unless the defendant 
establishes a (negative) ground of non-recognition, such as 
“jurisdiction based on the nationality of the plaintiff.”122 Such a list 
would contain all abusive grounds of jurisdiction, that is, those that 
have no characteristic link between court and case.123 The 
“Recognition in the U.S.” case would again pass this test and could be 
recognized, because jurisdiction based on the habitual residence of the 
child is not abusive. It is based on a real and substantial connection, 
the habitual residence of the child being the place where she goes to 
school, where her needs can best be established, etc. 
The negative-list approach is compelling by virtue of its simplicity 
and open approach (all non-listed jurisdictions would be acceptable). 
On the other hand, a positive-list of specifically accepted grounds of 
jurisdiction may better ensure the protection of local defendants, as 
the grounds of jurisdiction used by foreign courts are unforeseeable. It 
could be risky to open the door of judgments recognition too widely. 
It is therefore assumed that a positive list has some advantages 
compared to a negative one. In contrast to a case-by-case approach, 
these solutions would be much more predictable and foster legal 
certainty. 
 
Family Maintenance, signed (but not ratified) by the U.S. Art. 20 allows the contracting 
states to make a reservation in respect of this ground of jurisdiction. 
121 Example taken from the currently ongoing work at the Hague Conference in the 
Judgments project, cf. Hague Conference, supra note 1. 
122 Compare the 2005 proposal of the American Law Institute regarding a Foreign 
Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act. For more information, see Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, AM. LAW 
INST., https://www.ali.org/publications/show/recognition-and-enforcement-foreign-judg 
ments-analysis-and-proposed-federal-statute/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
123 Such as “umbrella jurisdiction,” based on the mere presence of assets, exemplified 
by a forgotten umbrella, unrelated to the case, in the jurisdiction of the court. 
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D. Replacing Procedural Due Process by Indirect Jurisdiction 
A major problem with the American system of judgments 
recognition lies with the expression of “due process.” As the question 
of jurisdictional grounds is currently considered in the U.S. legal 
system as part of the due process principle, criticizing jurisdictional 
grounds may be seen as denying due process to defendants, which 
incurs immediate and harsh backlash. This makes it difficult to 
question the appropriateness of the current U.S. system. 
Of course, the defendant should enjoy a fair trial in international 
cases. The main point of this paper is that the defendant should not be 
protected by jurisdictional grounds that are irrelevant to international 
situations. It therefore seems important to change the use of due 
process when talking about jurisdictional requirements, and instead 
use the internationally accepted expression “indirect jurisdiction.” 
This would separate the jurisdictional aspect of due process (question 
of the jurisdictional power of foreign courts) from its normative, 
procedural ones (questions of fair trial, judicial independence, etc.). 
Due process can (and should) of course remain relevant with respect 
to procedural fairness such as impartial judges and the right to be 
heard, but not with respect to indirect jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The mirror principle is a theoretically convincing approach to 
indirect jurisdiction. Yet, as the foregoing analysis has shown, its 
practical application can give rise to problems. The best solution is to 
question and refrain from applying the mirror principle in all the cases 
where the mirrored grounds are not appropriate for being mirrored 
due to the national and federal context of their development. 
The selective non-application of the mirror principle would create a 
gap that must be closed. The most promising solution would be the 
development of an international notion of jurisdictional due process, 
uncoupled from the requirements of International Shoe, as the 
protective link between court and defendant is not systemically 
required outside of the United States, where the procedural laws often 
privilege the defendant. This would allow the recognition of foreign 
judgments (even if based on jurisdictional grounds unknown by local 
standards) as long as there was a sufficient link between the case and 
the court. An example would be jurisdiction at the domicile of a 
maintenance creditor. 
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In common law countries such as the United States, where the 
development of law is among the duties of the courts, the 
development of an international notion of due process could be 
possible without having to amend the Constitution. It would be a 
small step for a judge, but one giant leap for (foreign) judgments. 
 
